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PENN LAW SCHOOL MASS TORTS SYMPOSIUM: A RESPONSE
TO PROFESSOR COOPER
EDWARD R. BECKER ANDJEROME M. MARCUSt t
Our hats are off to Professor Cooper for his production of a brilliant paper on the legal concerns presented by complex mass torts
litigation.' His paper discusses the entire array of complex legal problems and issues raised by the adjudication of mass tort claims. The
scope of this Response does not permit us to delve into the specifics of
each of the topics that he has addressed; we shall therefore focus on
what we believe are the larger issues.
To begin, Professor Cooper's proposed Mass Tort Statute, Mass
Tort Civil Rule, and Settlement Class Rule each offer the current best
conception of a total solution to the real problems encountered in
mass tort litigation. Unfortunately, the quarrels about the various
provisions of both proposals demonstrate that all of the constituencies
represented here today simply cannot and, as a practical matter, will
not, reach a full agreement about a solution. Much of the conflict inherent in these proposals rests in the evaluation of value-determined
choices that perforce form the foundations for each attempt to create
a workable, guiding statute or rule. Just a partial list of the competing
values underlying this debate necessarily includes the differing attitudes on matters such as aggregation versus individualization of
claims; the importance of process; tolerance for uncertainty; tolerance
for the subjugation of individual claims which present a unique element of plaintiff fault, causation, and damage issues to the "great aggregate"; beliefs in the efficacy of opt-in versus opt-out provisions; perspectives on the fictional nature of legal representation in the mass
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torts context; and notions of the appropriate role of federalism.
For analytical purposes, let us grant, however, that the realpolitik
at work means that Professor Cooper has made the right assumptions,
especially with regard to the aggregation problem. Within this
framework, we make the following points, focusing especially on process.
Professor Cooper's proposal illuminates three main points. The
first, made abundantly clear by his careful exposition, is the rich and,
we believe, overwhelming complexity of the problem. Although Professor Cooper describes a thoughtful-really, an exemplary-solution,
we think it clear that a global solution is utterly beyond reach. The
diversity of interests, along with the large number of constituencies
that espouse them (plaintiff, defendant, and beyond), and the need
for value-determined choices as discussed above, make such an endeavor a fruitless and frustrating pursuit.
The second point that Professor Cooper's analysis forces us to
confront is that a meaningful solution must inevitably be the product
of legislative action. We think this is clear because his thorough explication of the problems at work here shows that these are matters far
beyond the limited competence of the courts alone, even under the
most expansive possible interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act and
similar state law provisions or doctrines. That fact does not mean that
other mechanisms, such as rulemaking and didactic exercises like this
conference, must be discarded. Such approaches can provide a meaningful aid to the development and operation of a well-tailored act or
statute. But real change can be achieved only with a properly fashioned legislative enactment.
The last point we gather from Professor Cooper's presentation is
that the usefulness of any study, symposium, or other discussion concerning a solution to the problems generated by mass tort litigation
requires the participation of all relevant people and constituencies.
Casting an eye over the participants to this symposium, we disagree
with the suggestion of Judge Scirica that all of the necessary parties to
the dialogue are represented here today.
This symposium has
rounded up the usual suspects-judges, law professors, and plaintiffs'
and defendants' lawyers, who handle both individual and class actions.
There are, however, a number of other interested parties and constituencies who are not here and ought to be involved in the development of the solutions: the business executives who decide whether
to settle or go forward with litigation and therefore decide whether to
"bet the company"; insurance executives; consumers; state attorneys
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general; scientists; economists; and members of Congress.
It is, of course, true that the problem of identifying which people
in these categories are the right ones could itself be the topic of a long
debate. In the end, some reasonable but arbitrary decisions will have
to be made. This list of viable participants once again emphasizes the
daunting challenge of creating a solution via consensus, but we think
it important to involve all of these constituencies even though we cannot expect them to agree with one another. Even without agreement,
the interaction of these different points of view will help the legislatures and the courts to move toward valuable solutions. Perhaps other
programs similar to this symposium, such as the upcoming conference
in Florida sponsored by Duke Law School, will take up the challenge.
We thus suggest expanding the list of presenters and participants at
these conferences.
As these academic explorations continue, we believe that it will
also be useful to identify the incentives each group faces in evaluating
specific solutions. Those incentives, as well as the potential solutions
themselves, should be catalogued. We think the result might be a
valuable tool for assessing possible approaches to a solution. But a
better approach than pure symposia would be the appointment by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of a committee that can be
charged with the responsibility of drafting formal legislative proposals.
This effort could be patterned on such bodies as the White Commission on Circuit Structure. Even better, Congress might create a committee like the Federal Courts Study Committee. The latter had Congressmen on it and-relatedly-actually developed legislation that was
adopted.
Leaving aside the manner in which a workable solution may be
derived and the form it should take, we would like to offer our own,
albeit partial, solution. This solution draws from the premise that the
best hope for a practical mechanism to resolve mass tort suits is found
in enhancing the ability of the federal courts to manage multistate
class actions. In this respect we agree with Ken Feinberg that neither
Amchem? nor Ortiz3 sounds the death knell for multistate class litigation
in federal court.
Most mass tort actions in federal court are based on diversity jurisdiction. A huge obstacle to effective management, and sometimes
to class treatment itself, is the variation in state laws. To effect an en-
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hancement of court managerial authority, we think Congress should
enact a choice-of-law statute that would facilitate multistate class action litigation. Such an act would certainly pass constitutional muster.
We think that it will be productive to bring pressure on Congress to
focus on this type of tool. The way to get something done in Congress
is to focus on one measure at a time instead of a whole laundry list,
which is what we have done too often.
It is also realistic to try to bring the following mechanisms into existence:
(1) More uniform state laws. As noted above, the existing
variations among state laws are problematic. The differences
are, as often as not, idiosyncratic and not reflective of policy
choices. Especially problematic in national mass tort litigation are the extremes typically found in one or two jurisdictions. The need for different substantive law choices to be
made in different states can be respected by having states
choose one of several different approaches.
(2) A substantive "best-practices"program.Such a program
is in place at the state level on procedural matters, under the
aegis of the Conference of State Chief Justices and the National Center for State Courts. It now focuses largely on
procedure. It should be expanded to substantive matters, so
as to eliminate "outlier" states and counties.
(3) Reform of the law on punitive damages. This should be
dealt with either by the best-practices program or, optimally,
by a Supreme Court decision that imposes some order in this
area.
Finally, in this age of national and even international markets,
some areas of substantive law should become subject only to federal
regulation and therefore to preemption. The asbestos cases fall in
this category, as do many other products liability cases and environmental contamination suits. We believe that the repetitive imposition
of punitive damages in mass tort claims, which we find constitutionally
problematic, is also best dealt with by a single, generally applicable,
federal rule. Such a rule should be imposed by statute if not by constitutional mandate through a Supreme Court decision.
An essential element to any solution, whether it is a choice-of-law
statute or a mass tort civil rule, is an increase in the level of cooperation between the federal and state judiciaries. We do not favor Francis

20001

RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR COOPER

2005

McGovern's Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") proposals4 whereby a
federal judge assigns state cases. The state courts would resent this
procedure, and it would generate animosity between the two judicial
systems. Rather, we should enhance those mechanisms currently in
place and co-opt the "outliers" that produce distorted results. We can
also increase the number and breadth ofjoint federal-state databases,
such as the Third Circuit Death Penalty Data Base, that provide information useful to courts in both the state and federal systems.
We note in this regard that while courts cannot solve all of the
problems presented by mass tort litigation, there are several things
they can do without legislation to avoid or minimize some of the problems. Cooperation among federal courts before which similar matters
are pending can already be enforced through the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, which is empowered to avoid duplication of
various efforts such as discovery by consolidating all similar cases before a single court. When cases are pending in both state and federal
fora, no panel is currently empowered to move all cases to a single jurisdiction, but there is no reason why judges in differentjurisdictions
cannot cooperate with one another and agree to proceed, or even to
rule, in lockstep.
There is also no reason, for instance, why cooperation between
state and federal cases cannot produce a single plan of discovery, proposed to and adopted by both the state and federal courts hearing the
cases. Such cooperation can be facilitated by the distribution of
documents to all such fora and by the simple expedient of the judges
in each court speaking with one another over the telephone. A number of cases have benefited from cooperation of this kind.
We would also encourage the adoption of a settlement-class rule,
something that we think can be done consistent with the charter of
Amchem. Although the Supreme Court's decision in Amchem does not
bind the Federal Rules Committee, the Court's decision represents
sound policy in that it insures cohesiveness and fidelity to due process
with respect to the adequacy of legal representation, including any related conflicts of interest. This means that any revision to Rule 23 to
allow for settlement classes should continue to require the presence of
Francis E. McGovern, Toward a CooperativeStrategy forFederaland StateJudges in
Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867, 1892 (2000) (proposing that the trans4See

feree judge be allowed to "oversee pretrial discovery for both federal and state cases" in
order to eliminate redundant discovery; that the MDLjudge be allowed to try individual cases from a broad geographical distribution; and that the MDL judge also be
permitted to "remand a limited number of cases to state and federal courts for trial").
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the factors enumerated by Rule 23(a),5 and satisfaction of the predominance test even in a settlement context.
On the subject of settlement, courts can also take useful steps to
alleviate the risk that separate sets of plaintiffs' lawyers are played off
against one another to the detriment of the respective classes they
each represent. We speak here of reports of efforts by defendants in
various mass tort cases to cause the plaintiffs' camps to bid against one
another to settle the cases. The existence of separate cases being
handled by competing groups of lawyers means that a defendant can
in effect induce the groups to bid against one another. Because the
cases are handled by plaintiffs' lawyers on a contingency basis, a group
that fails to reach a settlement will get nothing if another group does
come to terms with the defendant. This creates the risk of suboptimal
settlements that are not in the best interest of the class. This problem
can be prevented, or at least ameliorated, if the courts before which
the competing cases are pending cooperate on hearing and approving
settlements. If that cannot be achieved, it is possible for a court-at
least one that has exclusive jurisdiction over a claim pending before
it-to order the defendant to provide that court with notice of any settlement it plans to enter into that would release such claims. Such an
order does not bar the defendant from entering into the state court
settlement; it merely requires that the federal court be given notice
and the opportunity to assess the settlement before it is entered into.
This may enable the state and federal judges to consult with one another about the merits of the settlements, to the ultimate benefit of
the class.
As Professor Cooper's paper shows by revealing the complexities
of this issue, the key question facing those of us interested in developing a meaningful solution to the problem of mass tort litigation is how
to get Congress interested. We believe the formation of a committee
5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) requires:

One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. GC. P. 23(a).
6 The predominance test is outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)
(3),
which allows a class action to be maintained if "the court finds that the questions of law
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. 1L Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
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such as we have described can lead us toward a workable consensus
that has a real chance of being enacted by Congress. A solution to the
challenges of complex mass torts litigation can be fashioned. It will
take time and hard work, but we can make real progress. As we try to
craft such a solution, however, we think it absolutely essential that all
participants have clear in their minds the difference between substance and procedure. Many, if not most, of the participants in the
debates on these issues will have a substantive perspective: they will
either favor expanded recovery rights for those affected by mass torts,
or they will be hostile to such rights and seek contraction of the right
to obtain damages or other relief. To the extent that proposals are
advanced and assessed by those with such a substantive perspective,
however, we think it essential that substance be clearly identified and
divorced from procedure.
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